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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PAUL MACIAS VILLALOBOS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48406-2020
Bingham County Case No.
CR06-19-4542

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ISSUES
1.
Has Villalobos failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when
it sentenced him to five years with two and a half years fixed following his plea of guilty to
aggravated assault?
2.
Has Villalobos failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Law enforcement responded to a report that Villalobos threatened N.T. with a knife. (PSI,
p.7.) Sammie Ballard reported that Villalobos pulled a foot-long teal colored knife and was being
1

verbally aggressive towards N.T. (PSI, p.7.) N.T. reported that she had given Villalobos a ride in
her vehicle but he would not give her a destination, so she drove to Ballard’s residence. (PSI, p.7.)
At the residence, Villalobos came towards N.T. with a knife and told her to get back in the car.
(PSI, p.7.) Ballard fought with Villalobos and took the knife, then called 911. (PSI, p.7.) N.T.
reported she was in fear for her life and Villalobos had stabbed her in the past. (PSI, p.55.)
The state charged Villalobos with aggravated assault, along with a sentencing enhancement
for the use of a deadly weapon. (R., pp.21-23.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Villalobos pleaded
guilty to aggravated assault and the state dismissed the enhancement. (R., pp.36-47; 11/18/2019
Tr., p.15, L.25 – p.17, L.4.) The district court sentenced Villalobos to five years with two and a
half years fixed. (R., pp.89-91; 10/19/2020 Tr., p.18, L.23 – p.19, L.3.) Villalobos filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp.98-99, 104-07.) Thereafter, Villalobos filed a Rule 35 motion for the
reduction of his sentence, to which the state objected. (R., pp.109-14.) After a hearing, the district
court denied Villalobos’ motion. (Aug., p.1; see also 2/23/2021 Tr. 1)
ARGUMENT
I.
Villalobos Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Villalobos asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to five

years with two and a half years fixed. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) Villalobos has shown no abuse
of discretion. The sentence imposed is reasonable in light of Villalobos’ underlying conduct,
criminal history, and lack of accountability or remorse.

1

The record was augmented to include the transcript of the Rule 35 motion hearing, which appears
in a separate document.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating
whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which
asks “whether the court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the determinate portion will be the period
of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing
Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate
to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
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Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not
substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.’” State v.
Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho
139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).
The sentence is reasonable in light of Villalobos’ underlying conduct and behavior
throughout the pendency of this case. 2 Villalobos pulled a foot-long knife, which appeared to be
a butcher knife, and wielded it while being verbally aggressive to N.T. (PSI, pp.7, 54.) Both N.T.
and Ballard reported to law enforcement that they feared for their lives, and N.T. reported that
Villalobos had stabbed her in the past. (PSI, pp.54-55.) Ballard had to fight the knife away from
Villalobos. (PSI, p.7.) While this case was pending, Villalobos had several pretrial release
violations, which ultimately led to his release being revoked. (R., pp.50-52, 60-61, 65.) After he
pleaded guilty, Villalobos failed to show for scheduled meetings with evaluators in preparation of
the PSI. (R., p.59.)
The sentence is also reasonable in light of Villalobos’ criminal history. (See PSI, pp.1011, 15-17.)

Villalobos has a juvenile record, and at the

was convicted of

misdemeanor aggravated assault, which was amended down from a felony. (PSI, p.10.) Of his
eight misdemeanor convictions, five are for assault or battery offenses. (PSI, p.10.) He has at
least one prior felony conviction out of Arizona for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; he
was placed on probation in that case but served his sentence after his probation was revoked. (PSI,
p.10.) Arizona Adult Probation and Parole indicated that Villalobos had felony cases from 2006,
The PSI also sets forth the facts underlying additional cases against Villalobos in which he was
charged with a total of four counts of violation of a no contact order protecting N.T., the victim in
this case. (PSI, p.8.) The charges arose from an incident in which law enforcement had to remove
Villalobos from N.T.’s hotel room and based on Villalobos’ attempts to contact N.T. through the
jail phone system, including 293 phone calls to N.T. in a little over one month. (PSI, p.8.)
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2012, and 2015 and in each case probation had been revoked. (PSI, p.10.) While incarcerated,
Villalobos received both major and minor disciplinary sanctions for fighting, positive or refused
UA tests, disorderly conduct, and disobeying a verbal or written order. (PSI, pp.18, 41.) Further,
Villalobos had several other pending cases at the time of the PSI, including charges for violation
of a no contact order, violation of a protection order, and battery. (PSI, p.17.) His LSI score rated
him as a high risk of recidivism. (PSI, pp.9-10.)
Additionally, the sentence is reasonable in light of Villalobos’ failure to accept
responsibility for his actions. The PSI indicated that Villalobos “blamed ‘the system’” and
“[e]xpressed an entrenched criminal value system.” (PSI, pp.9, 11.) When asked about his violent
criminal history, Villalobos “said that only one of them was violent, things just look worse on
paper.” (PSI, p.11.) He made excuses about his previous failures on probation. (PSI, p.11.)
Villalobos commented in the PSI that he believed he should get probation for his pending felony
violation of a no contact order case because “all I was doing is taking [sic] to the some one I love
and going to marry one day.” (PSI, p.19.) At sentencing, Villalobos continued to minimize his
behavior and made excuses for his past failures on probation, asserting that he “almost completed”
his probationary terms but probation was “an intensive probation where you couldn’t be around
nobody so like you had to have permission” and “[t]hey checked everything in the house so it was
very difficult.” (10/19/2020 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-14.) Villalobos asserted he had “one violation but
there was no way for me to complete 5 and a half years. So I almost completed it I don’t see how
I can’t be a candidate for probation.” (10/19/2020 Tr., p.15, Ls.15-18.) As the district court noted,
Villalobos seemed to “fail to really acknowledge the serious nature of [his] behavior not only in
this incident but in the past” and instead he “kind of downplay[s] it and minimize[s] it.”
(10/19/2020 Tr., p.17, L.23 – p.18, L.1.) His “violent tendencies and failure to acknowledge that
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he has committed a crime places the community at risk.” (PSI, p.19; see also 10/19/2020 Tr., p.18,
Ls.19-22.)
The district court properly considered the objectives of criminal sentencing as well as the
criteria set forth in I.C. § 19-2521. (10/19/2020 Tr., p.16, Ls.10-17.) The district court considered
the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, the PSI, and the competency evaluation.
(10/19/2020 Tr., p.16, Ls.18-24.) The district court recognized aggravating factors such as the
underlying conduct, Villalobos’ criminal history (including that the underlying felony charge is
the same crime for which he had previously been convicted and his other prior assault or battery
convictions), his pretrial release violations and revocation, and his high LSI score. (10/19/2020
Tr., p.6, Ls.13-18; p.16, L.25 – p.17, L6; p.17, Ls.21-23.) The district court also considered
Villalobos’ mitigating factors, including his substance abuse issues and that he appeared to “have
some serious mental health issues that need to be addressed and they may be a contributing factor
to some of [his] aggression.” (10/19/2020 Tr., p.17, Ls.7-19.) In light of the fact that Villalobos
“had trouble complying with basic terms of pretrial release which would be some of the terms that
would be required of [him] on probation” and his failure to accept responsibility for his violent
behavior, the district court concluded that a period of incarceration was necessary to achieve the
goals of criminal sentencing and protect the community. (10/19/2020 Tr., p.18, Ls.2-8, 19-22.)
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of five years with two
and a half years fixed.
Villalobos argues that the sentence is excessive in light of mitigating information, such as
his substance abuse and mental health issues. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) However, the district
court specifically considered that mitigating information. (See R., p.87; see also 10/19/2020 Tr.,
p.17, Ls.7-19.) Evidence of Villalobos’ mental health was documented in the sentencing materials.
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(See PSI, pp.11, 15, 21, 25-26, 32-34, 75-80.) The district court recognized that the GAIN
evaluation concluded that Villalobos did not meet the definition of serious mental illness, but the
court nonetheless considered that he appeared to “have some serious mental health issues that need
to be addressed and they may be a contributing factor to some of [his] aggression.” (10/19/2020
Tr., p.17, Ls.12-19.) The district court reasonably concluded that incarceration, where Villalobos
could seek treatment in a secure environment, was appropriate. Villalobos has failed to show that
the district court abused its discretion.
II.
Villalobos Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied
His Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
A.

Introduction
Villalobos asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35

motion for reduction of his sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) Villalobos has shown no abuse
of discretion. His motion was based on a mental health assessment obtained after he was
sentenced. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it considered that information and
determined that it did not render the otherwise-reasonable sentence excessive.
B.

Standard Of Review
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,

addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d
381, 385 (Ct. App. 2015). Where a sentence is neither illegal nor excessive when pronounced,
“the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion.” State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho
177, 180, 369 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840).
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“An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the
underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.” Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159
P.3d at 840.
C.

Villalobos Failed To Show His Sentence Was Excessive In Light Of New Information
Villalobos sought a reduction of his sentence based on a mental health assessment obtained

after sentencing, which was presented to and considered by the district court. (R., pp.109-13; Aug.
Conf. Doc.) However, the assessment supports that the sentence imposed was reasonable.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Villalobos’ Rule 35 motion.
The evaluating clinician reported that Villalobos’ scores indicate moderate depression,
possible anxiety, a low probability of a mood disorder, and “a high probability of malingering.”
(Aug. Conf. Doc., p.1 (emphasis added).) Villalobos’ comments and behaviors noted in the report
support the clinician’s concerns of malingering, as they demonstrate his goal to obtain a mental
health diagnosis as a way to have his sentence reduced:
•

“If I have a diagnosis of a mental illness I get a liter [sic] sentence. … People who have a
mental illness get a reduced sentence so that is what I am hoping for.” (Aug. Conf. Doc.,
p.1 (quotation mark omitted).)

•

“[Villalobos] would continue to report to clinician that if he was mentally ill his sentencing
would not be as harsh so he was hoping to get a diagnosis of mental illness.” (Aug. Conf.
Doc., p.4.)

•

“[Villalobos] read a book about processing criminals and in that book it stated that if people
are mentally ill they get lesser time, so that is why I am filing a Rule 35.” (Aug. Conf.
Doc., p.6.)

•

“[Villalobos’] thought content was focused around making sure clinician would be giving
him a mental health diagnosis.” (Aug. Conf. Doc., p.8.)

•

“[Villalobos] wants to have a mental illness so he can get a lighter sentence.” (Aug. Conf.
Doc., p.8.)
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•

“Clinician observed in the 2 ½ hours she was conducting the assessment with [Villalobos]
that he did not respond to any internal stimuli. It is very unusual for someone that reports
that significant amount of psychosis to not respond to anything in a 2 ½ hour time frame.”
(Aug. Conf. Doc., p.3.)

The district court expressed concern that, although the assessment indicated Villalobos may have
antisocial personality disorder, it also indicated malingering, “meaning, that Mr. Villalobos during
his examination was exaggerating or feigning illness…trying to obtain a mental health evaluation
in hopes of getting a lower sentence.” (2/23/2021 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-23; p.9, L.20 – p.10, L.15.)
Aside from the malingering concerns, the assessment also detailed concerning comments
from Villalobos regarding his violent behavior and substance abuse issues. Villalobos’ comments
demonstrate his continued violent thought processes: “If anybody gets in my face I would stab
them and would not think anything about it. People mess with me all the time so I will get them
before they get me.” (Aug. Conf. Doc., pp.3, 4 (“I will stab or kill anybody that gets in my way.”).)
These comments are particularly concerning, given that the underlying charge arose from
Villalobos threatening N.T. with a knife and N.T. reported he had stabbed her in the past. When
discussing his alleged visual and auditory hallucinations, Villalobos “made a lot of statements
about rape and hearing people being raped and talking about how big the body parts were that the
girls were being raped by. Each and every time [Villalobos] talked about rape and body parts he
looked at the clinician in hopes to get some sort of reaction from her.” (Aug. Conf. Doc., p.3
(quotation mark omitted).) Villalobos’ alleged psychotic episodes seemed to stem from drug use;
“with each story he told he would talk about smoking and thinking he was tripping or something.”
(Aug. Conf. Doc., p.3.) Despite reporting significant drug use and a desire to continue using drugs,
Villalobos denied having any substance abuse issues and instead claimed his problems were
“mental health related.” (Aug. Conf. Doc., p.5.) The assessment concluded that Villalobos’
“primary need is substance treatment as soon as possible.” (Aug. Conf. Doc., p.11.) The district
9

court expressed concern that Villalobos recognized substance abuse as a barrier but commented
that he enjoys using drugs and drinking alcohol, and how the drugs in Arizona are better than in
Idaho because the drugs in this state “are weak.” (2/23/2021 Tr., p.10, Ls.20-25.)
The district court recognized its discretion. (2/23/2021 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-19.) The district
court recognized that there appeared to be a mental health disorder in play, given the diagnosis of
antisocial personality disorder with malingering concerns and Villalobos’ concerning pattern of
criminal behavior. (2/23/2021 Tr., p.18, Ls.14-20.) However, “[t]he evaluation that’s been
submitted under Rule 35 simply indicated, again, the need for substance abuse treatment.”
(2/23/2021 Tr., p.18, Ls.8-10.) After detailing Villalobos’ criminal history, the district court
concluded that Villalobos “poses a severe risk to the community” and that his need for treatment
“doesn’t outweigh the need at this point for at least some incarceration.” (2/23/2021 Tr., p.19, L.8
– p.20, L.8.) The district court’s sentence was appropriately tailored to allow Villalobos to “begin
treatment in an in-custody setting both for mental health and substance abuse issues” and continue
“those treatment programs in an outpatient setting while still under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections” once he is paroled. (2/23/2021 Tr., p.20, Ls.6-13.) The district court
concluded that, even with the additional information, the sentence was appropriate. Villalobos has
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 7th day of July, 2021.

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of July, 2021, served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt File
and Serve:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

KLJ/dd

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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